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We fought for them, we've got them, we should keep them. They are necessary 
for our safety. I see no other course. 
Congressman F. Edward Hebert, 19451 
It is easier perhaps to increase the Federal appropriation year by year than to 
promote an active policy of economic development. For the Micronesians, on 
the other hand, such a trend is socially damaging and politically disastrous. 
No people, proud and conscious of the quality of its inheritance, can acquiesce 
in the proposition that it should become the pensioner of another. 
Micronesian Report on Future Political Status, 19692 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Republic of Palau, an isolated archipelago of Micronesia, 
must choose between sovereignty or dependence. Either option may 
prove costly. Palau is one of four districts that make up the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI).3 In addition to Palau, the 
trust territory includes the Northern Mariana Islands, the Feder-
ated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. The United 
States serves as administering authority or "trustee" of the TTPI 
under the United Nations Charter (Charter) and the Trusteeship 
Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands (Trustee-
ship Agreement).4 
Each of the TTPI districts, except Palau, has negotiated a sep-
arate agreement with the United States towards ending the trust-
eeship and gaining new political status. The Northern Mariana 
Islands have accepted commonwealth status,5 while the Federated 
1 See D. McHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 66 (1975). 
2 FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA 14-
15 (1969) [hereinafter REPORT] (available at the International Legal Studies Library of Har-
vard Law School). 
3 Palau lies approximately 600 miles east of the Philippines. The archipelago is made up 
of twenty-two islands of which only eight are habitable. H. BARNETT, BEING A PALAUAN 2 
(1960). 
4 U.N. CHARTER art. 76; Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated 
Islands, Apr. 2-July IS, 1947, United States-U.N. Security Council, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1665, S U.N.T.S. IS9 [hereinafter Trusteeship Agreement]. 
5 Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political 
Union with the United States of America, H.R.]' Res. 549, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S.]. 
Res. 107, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976) [hereinafter 
Covenant]. 
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States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands have approved a 
"Compact of Free Association" with the United States.6 Under the 
terms of this agreement, the United States provides continued fi-
nancial assistance to the islands in return for control over security 
and defense matters. The United States needs the Palau an islands 
for military purposes, particularly if the current Philippine bases 
are lost. 7 
Although the people of Palau have voted upon several versions 
of a Compact of Free Association on six separate occasions, a Com-
pact has never been approved. If the current Compact is approved, 
Palau will receive desperately needed economic assistance of ap-
proximately 460 million dollars from the United States over the 
next fifteen years.s In return, the United States stands to secure a 
valuable strategic base in the Pacific. The Compact allows the United 
States to take an unlimited amount of land for military operations 
and also to operate nuclear vessels in the region. 9 
The Compact is popular with many Palauans because it will 
provide immediate grant aid to what is otherwise a subsistence 
economy. Approval of the Compact, however, may also mean the 
loss of large tracts of scarce Palauan land and result in the extreme 
militarization of the islands. Palau has become a battleground be-
tween pro-Compact islanders and a group of activists who fear the 
political, social, and environmental consequences of the Compact. 
The center of the ongoing legal controversy is the conflict between 
specific anti-nuclear provisions of Palau's Constitution and the Com-
pact provisions which allow American nuclear vessels to transit Pa-
lauan waters. IO Since the Compact would allow nuclear substances 
in Palau, the Palau an Constitution requires that seventy-five percent 
fi Compact of Free Association Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-239, 99 Stat. 1770 (1986). 
The Federated States of Micronesia approved the Compact by a majority of 79% while the 
Marshall Island approving majority was only 58%. S. REP. No. 403, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 
reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6207, 6231 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. 
7 See infra notes 22 and 23; Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Committee said that Palau would be "one of the first or priority areas [sic] that we 
have to look at" in case of the loss of the Philippine bases. From a statement of Mr. Alcalay 
before tbe Trusteeship Council on May 12, 1988, U.N. Doc. T/PV.1650 at 8. 
R 135 CONGo REc. H 3200 (daily ed. June 27,1989) (statement of Rep. de Lugo) [here-
inafter de Lugo Statement]. 
9 Compact of Free Association Between the Government of the United States and the 
Government of Palau, §§ 321-323, reprinted in Pub. L. No. 99-658, tit. II, § 20 I, 100 Stat. 
3672,3695 (1986) [hereinafter Compact]; Gibbons V. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. at 31 (Palau 
App. Div. Sept. 17, 1986) (on file at Boston College Third World Law Journal Office). 
10 Compact, supra note 9, at § 324. 
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of the population approve the Compact. 1I Palau's current political 
status remains that of trust territory because this required seventy-
five percent majority has never been achieved in a plebiscite. 
In addition to Palau an approval of the Compact, the U.N. 
Charter specifies that the U.N. Security Council must sanction any 
"alteration or amendment" to the Trusteeship Agreement. 12 Recent 
actions by the United States suggest an attempt to circumvent this 
provision of the Charter and unilaterally terminate the trustee-
ship.13 It is likely, however, that unilateral termination of the trust-
eeship would violate international law. 14 The need for United N a-
tions approval may subject American policy in Palau and the other 
TTPI districts to scrutiny by the international community. 
This Note examines the progress of Palau from colonial pos-
session to self-governing state. Although this process is not com-
plete, Palau's transformation is significant because it has occurred 
under the United Nations Trusteeship System. The goals of the 
trusteeship system are to "promote the political, economic, social, 
and educational advancement of the trust territories towards self-
government or independence .... "15 Whether or not the United 
States has successfully met these goals, and the degree of protection 
afforded Palau by the international trusteeship regime, is the ulti-
mate focus of this Note. 
Part II of this Note presents an historical perspective on the 
Pacific Trusteeship and the strategic importance of the region. Part 
III examines the movement towards decolonization and the begin-
nings of self-government in the TTPI. Part IV describes the current 
crisis in Palau and the legal battles recently fought to protect the 
Palauan Constitution. Part V concludes with an examination of the 
role of the United Nations in determining Palau's future political 
status. Much of the information presented in this Note is of 
an historical nature. The history and development of Palau and 
of the TTPI are central to the question of whether the United 
States has met its obligations towards the trust territory under the 
Charter. 
II PALAU CONST. art. XIII, § 6; art. II § II. 
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. I. 
13 See Letter to the Editor-in-Chief from Roger S. Clarke (June 10, 1987), reprinted in 81 
AM. J. INT'L L. 927, 929 (1987) [hereinafter Clarke Letter). 
14 Id.; Marston, Termination a/Trusteeship, 18 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 1,28-31 (1969). 
15 U.N. CHARTER art. 76. 
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II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE TRUSTEESHIP 
A. Strategic Importance 
Since World War II, the United States has maintained a strong 
military presence in Micronesia. 16 Between 1942 and 1944, some of 
the costliest battles of the war were fought in the region. 17 The 
territory remains militarized. For example, the American base at 
Kwajalein atoll in the Marshall Islands represents an American 
investment of over two billion dollars18 and continues to be a splash-
down point for missile tests; 19 Guam has been used for the deploy-
ment of over 400 nuclear warheads; and two-thirds of Tinian Island 
in the Northern Mariana Islands has been set aside for military 
purposes.20 
Micronesia is critically situated between two important Ameri-
can allies, Australia and Japan, and United States control of the 
region is considered to be of great strategic importance.21 The 
strategic importance of Palau, in particular, is directly linked to the 
fate of American bases on the Philippines.22 If the American pres-
ence on the Philippines is imperiled, Palau is considered to be an 
excellent "fallback" option in the region. 23 Palau's Malakal Harbor 
is one of the widest in the region and has been discussed as a possible 
post for Trident submarines.24 Thus, the strategic importance of 
16 U.S. bases at Hawaii, American Samoa, Australia, Okinawa, Japan, Korea, and the 
Philippines dot the Pacific and Pacific "Rim" area. Wittwer, Island Nation Wins a Round in 
Fight for an Anti-Nuclear Constitution, RESIST NEWSL., June-July 1988, at 3. 
17 The battle at Saipan left over 13,000 dead and wounded. The battle at Pelelieu, in 
Palau, cost 1,864 American lives and left 6,459 wounded. Over 5,000 Micronesians were 
killed during the War. D. McHENRY, supra note 1, at 54. 
18 H.R. REP. No. 188, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2746, 2927 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
19 Kwajalein Missile Base is along a perfect trajectory from Vandenburg Air Force Base 
in California. "Dummy" ballistic missiles are easily recovered from the atoll's shallow lagoon. 
Armstrong, Strategic Underpinnings of the Legal Regime of Free Association: The Negotiations for 
the Future Political Status of Micronesia, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 179, 195 (1981). 
20 Wittwer, supra note 16, at 3. 
21 An American presence is necessary for purposes of "strategic denial," that is preventing 
an enemy power from gaining a toehold in the region and protecting crucial sealanes. HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 18, at 2750. This policy is an important part of the Compact. Compact, 
supra note 9, § 311. 
22 Wittwer, supra note 16, at 3. 
23 Id.; de Lugo Statement, supra note 8, at H3203. 
24 American Friends Service Committee, Briefing Paper on Self-Determination for Belau 
(Palau), at 5 (Aug. 8, 1987) [hereinafter Briefing Paper]. The Department of Defense has 
also considered using 32,000 acres of Babelthaup, one of Palau's main islands, as a Marine 
training facility and maneuver area. D. McHENRY, supra note I, at 71. 
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Palau and of Micronesia has, in many ways, dictated its history. 
Foreign powers, mindful of strategic concerns, have long controlled 
the region. 
B. Colonial History, the Mandate System, and the International 
Trusteeship System 
Palau has a long colonial history. The Spanish discovered the 
islands in 1543 and ruled the inhabitants until the end of the 
Spanish-American War.25 Germany then purchased Spain's interests 
in the Pacific and controlled the region until her defeat in World 
War J.26 After the war, under the Covenant of the League of Nations 
Mandate System, Japan was named as Mandatory for Micronesia 
and tightly controlled the islands in the years leading up to World 
War IJ.27 
After World War II, the League of Nations Mandate System 
was transformed into the International Trusteeship System under 
chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the U.N. Charter. The Charter iden-
tified as trust territories League of Nations Mandates, territories 
detached from enemy states during the war, and other territories 
voluntarily placed under trusteeship.28 Eleven trust territories were 
placed under the International Trusteeship System through indi-
vidual agreements between the administering authority member 
state and the United Nations. 29 
The American victory over the Japanese left the United States 
in control of Micronesia at the end of the war. The United States 
government had to decide at this time whether to place the area 
under the new trusteeship system or to annex it. As a signatory of 
the U.N. Charter and the Atlantic Charter, the United States would 
25 H. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 2. 
26 Robbins, United States Trusteeship for the Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1947 DEP'T ST. 
BULL. 783, 784. 
27 Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations bound members to "undertake 
to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of the territories under their control" and 
to refrain from military fortification. Japan heavily fortified the islands prior to the war in 
contravention of the Covenant. Robbins, supra note 26, at 784-85. 
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 77, para. 1. 
29 The British assumed trusteeship of Tanganyika, the British Cameroons and British 
Togoland. The French administered French Togoland and the French Cameroons. Other 
territories were Belgian Ruanda-Urundi; Italian Somaliland; Australian Nauru and New 
Guinea; and Western Samoa which was administered by New Zealand. U.N. DEPT. OF PUBLIC 
INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND DECOLONIZATION, 1980, at 8, U.N. Doc. DPII678-
80-41551 (1980) [hereinafter DECOLONIZATION]. 
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have had difficulty annexing the Pacific territory.30 Many American 
representatives, however, preferred direct annexation of Micronesia 
to the trusteeship arrangement.31 This was the view of Congressman 
Mike Mansfield, who stated: 
I would prefer to have the United States assume complete and 
undisputed control .... We need these islands for our future 
defense, and they should be fortified wherever we deem it 
necessary. We have no concealed motives because we want these 
islands for one purpose only and that is national security. Eco-
nomically they will be a liability, socially they will present prob-
lems, and politically we will have to work out a policy of admin-
istration. No other nation has any kind of claim to the mandates. 
No other nation has paid the price we have .... 32 
The State Department took the view that to exempt Micronesia 
from the new trusteeship system would lead to "reservations of 
other nations until the non-aggrandizement plan of the Atlantic 
Charter would become a mockery."33 The latter view prevailed and 
the U.N. Security Council approved the Trusteeship Agreement on 
April 2, 1947.34 
The Trusteeship Agreement was unique in that the territory 
was designated a "strategic" trust unlike any other U.N. trust ter-
ritory. Instead of supervision by the Trusteeship Council and the 
General Assembly, the American negotiators requested that the 
Security Council have oversight of the TTPI. This arrangement has 
had far-reaching repercussions. 
C. The Trusteeship Agreement 
The trusteeship provided the United States with a legitimate 
and convenient method of protecting its national security interest 
30 Hills, Compact of Free Association for Micronesia: Constitutional and International Law Issues, 
18 INT'L LAW. 583, 592 (1984); Atlantic Charter, Joint Declaration by the President of the 
United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, August 14, 1941, (55 Stat. 
1603; Executive Agreement Series 236). The declaration states: "[The United States and the 
United Kingdom] seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other ... they desire to see no 
territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples con-
cerned." 
31 Hills, supra note 30, at 591. 
32 93 CONGo REC. 8733 (1947) (cited in Hills, supra note 30, at 591). 
33 H. NUFER, MICRONESIA UNDER AMERICAN RULE: AN EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC 
TRUSTEESHIP 1947-1977 at 27 (1978). 
34 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 4. 
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in Micronesia.35 The Trusteeship Agreement, however, had to meet 
the scrutiny of the United Nations and the international community. 
The history of the drafting of the Trusteeship Agreement provides 
evidence of the tensions within the international community over 
what would be required of an administering authority and what 
degree of sovereignty was due to the peoples of non-self-governing 
terri tories. 
The first United States draft of the Trusteeship Agreement 
provided merely that the United States would promote "the devel-
opment of the inhabitants of the trust territories towards self-gov-
ernment."36 The absence of the words "or independence" was noted 
by the representative of the Soviet Union and the draft was 
amendedY The United States, upon agreeing to add the indepen-
dence clause, insisted on including the words "as may be appropri-
ate to the particular circumstances ... " to follow the clause.38 The 
United States Representative added: 
In accepting article 6 [of the Trusteeship Agreement] as mod-
ified in order to include the objective of independence of the 
trust territory, the United States feels that it must record its 
opposition, not to the principle of independence, to which no 
people could be more consecrated than the people of the United 
States, but to the idea that in this case independence could be 
achieved in the foreseeable future. 39 
Under the Trusteeship Agreement, as adopted, the United 
States as administering authority has the right to establish bases, 
erect fortifications, station and employ armed forces, and make use 
of volunteer forces and facilities in the territories. 40 The terms of 
the strategic trusteeship also allow the United States to close speci-
fied areas for security reasons and suspend reports to or visits from 
the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations or General Assembly 
in the closed areas. 4 ! The United States has administered the TTPI 
under these terms for more than four decades. 
35 Hills, supra note 30, at 592. 
36 2 U.N. SCOR Supp. (No.8) 69, U.N. Doc. S/281 (1947). See generally Clarke, Self 
Determination and Free Association for Micronesia - Should the United States Terminate the Pacific 
Islands Trust? 21 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1,6-7 n.29 (1980). 
37 2 U.N. SCOR (113th mtg.) 415 (1947). 
38 2 U.N. SCOR (116th mtg.) 474 (1947). 
39 Id. 
40 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 4, art. 13. 
41 Id. 
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III. THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS DECOLONIZATION 
A. General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 
During the 1960s, world public opinion sharpened against the 
continued control of dependent territories by larger powers.42 Be-
tween 1957 and 1962, seven of the eleven trust territories attained 
independence or chose to join an adjacent independent state.43 The 
United Nations led the international movement towards decoloni-
zation. 
On December 14, 1960 the U.N. General Assembly issued Res-
olution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.44 This resolution was 
issued in part due to the international community's decision that 
Charter principles were being applied too slowly.45 The declaration 
states that the subjection of people to alien subjugation, domination, 
and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, 
is contrary to the Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion 
of world peace and co-operation.46 Further, the declaration provides 
that 
[i]mmediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Gov-
erning Territories or all other territories which have not yet 
attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of 
those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in ac-
cordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without 
any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable 
them to enjoy complete independence and freedom .... 47 
The declaration also specifies that inadequacy of political, economic, 
social, or educational preparedness should not serve as a pretext 
for delaying independence.48 
One day after the passage of Resolution 1514 (XV), the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1541 (XV) which provided that a non-
self-governing territory "can be said to have attained full measure 
of self-government by independence, integration with an indepen-
42 DECOLONIZATION, supra note 29, at 4. 
43 [d. at 3. 
44 G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
45 DECOLONIZATION, supra note 29, at 13-16. 
46 [d. 
47 G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 44, at para. 5. 
48 [d. at para. 3. 
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dent state, or by free association with an independent state."49 The 
resolution declares that free association 
. . . should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the 
peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed 
and democratic processes. It should be one which ... retains 
for the people of the territory . . . the freedom to modify the 
status through the expression of their will by democratic means 
and through constitutional processes. 
The associated territory should have the right to determine 
its internal constitution without outside interference, in accor-
dance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed 
wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as 
appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association 
agreed upon. 50 
The resolution makes clear that a freely associated territory should 
1) have a right to determine its internal constitution; 2) be allowed 
to choose its political status freely without compulsion; and 3) retain 
the right to become independent at a later time.51 The people of 
the TTPI were clearly influenced by the notion of free association 
described in Resolution 1541.52 In addition to resolutions, a U.N. 
Special Committee was formed to oversee the process of decoloni-
zation.53 The United States was subject to the scrutiny of the Com-
mittee because of its "colonial" stance in Guam, the Virgin Islands, 
American Samoa, and also the Trust Territories.54 
B. Towards Self-Government 
For the first two decades of the trusteeship, American policy 
towards the TTPI was characterized by non-interference or "benign 
49 Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not an Obli-
gation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for Under Article 73e of the Charter, G.A. 
Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) (emphasis added). 
50Id. 
51 Macdonald, Termination of the Strategic Trusteeship: Free Association, the United Nations, 
and International Law, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 235, 241 (1981). 
52 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 17-19. 
53 The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was created 
under General Assembly Resolution 1654, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 65, U.N. Doc. AI 
5100 (1962). 
54 de Smith, Options for Micronesia: A Potential Crisis for America's Pacific Trust Territory, 
N.Y.U. CENTER FOR INT'L STUD. POL'y PAPERS 1,20 (1969). 
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neglect."55 The changing international climate, however, made it 
difficult for the United States to continue this policy. In response 
to international criticism, a commission headed by Harvard econo-
mist Anthony Solomon was formed to suggest a new United States 
policy. 56 
This new policy, articulated in the Solomon Report, suggested 
the infusion of 42.1 million dollars over a four year period (1965-
1968), as well as "American style" education and the encouragement 
of self-ruleY The TTPI budget increased from 5.25 million dollars 
in 1960 to 48 million dollars in 1970.58 The effect of this increased 
aid was the growth of a large bureaucracy. Little was done, however, 
to stimulate the local economy. 59 
The Congress of Micronesia (COM) was formed in 1965 as a 
step toward Micronesian self-government.6o In 1967, the COM 
formed its own Future Political Status Committee, headed by Laz-
arus Salii who would later become Palauan President. The Com-
mittee issued a report in 1969 which recommended that the TTPI 
and the United States pursue a relationship of free association.61 
The report defined free association by the language used in General 
Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV).62 
" R. TRUMBULL, PARADISE IN TRUST 147-50 (1959). Later, as Micronesians began con-
sidering the history of the American presence in Micronesia they would note about this 
period: "Till recent years American officials commonly believed it was best that Micronesian 
people should continue to follow the way of life of their ancestors. This point of view had a 
sad irony for a large number of Micronesians who had to maintain such a way of life on 
islands strewn with unexploded bombs and other debris of the Second World War or in 
places to which they had been moved to permit testing of nuclear weapons in the vicinity of 
their traditional homes." REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. 
56 H. NUFER, supra note 33, at 57-58. 
57 The Solomon Report did not fail to note the "necessity" of continued U.S. control 
over the region. Epstein, Indigenous Attempts to Protect the Environment: A Pacific Island Case, 
17(2) J. ENVTL. SYSTEMS 131, 140 (1987-1988). 
5HId. at 140-41. 
59 H. NUFER, supra note 33, at 128. 
60 N. MELLER, THE CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA 195-96 (1969). 
61 REPORT, supra note 2, at 17. The final report, issued in 1969, considered three status 
options for Micronesia; independence, integration into the United States (e.g. commonwealth 
status or statehood), or free association. In compiling information for the document, the 
Commission held hearings throughout the territories and visited Guam, American Samoa, 
Nauru, Puerto Rico, and the American Virgin Islands to compare independent islands and 
American territories. The report criticized U.S. policies which had not helped to economically 
develop the TTPI and also noted the lack of progress towards replacing American personnel 
with Micronesians. REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. 
62Id. at 18. For discussion of free association, see generally, Broderick, Associated Statehood 
- A New Form of Colonization, 17 INT'!. & COMPo L.Q. 368, 402 (1968). 
176 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10:165 
The Micronesian Committee insisted that "the basic ownership 
of these islands rests with Micronesians ... [as] does the basic 
responsibility for governing them."63 The Committee members also 
recognized, however, that their islands were strategically important 
and were willing to allow the United States a measure of control 
over external military affairs in return for financial assistance.64 
Independence was listed as the Committee's second choice of polit-
ical status after free association. The accompanying financial hard-
ship of independence was the primary reason why this was not the 
Committee's top choice of political status.65 The Committee's report 
also stated the need for a Micronesian Constitution. The Committee 
determined that "the essence of self-government [is] that the people 
governed be empowered to adopt and to amend [this] basic docu-
ment of government. "66 
C. The Fragmentation of the Trust Territory and the Drafting of a 
Palauan Constitution 
In the 1970s, as political status negotiations continued, there 
was increasing political fragmentation among the TTPI districts.67 
Although the Congress of Micronesia pursued a status of free as-
sociation for the entire region, the people of the Northern Mariana 
Islands sought a separate, more permanent relationship with the 
United States.68 In 1975, the Northern Mariana Islands signed a 
Commonwealth agreement with the United States.69 The division 
of the trust territory continued as each district sought to best protect 
their own particular interests. 
In 1978, Palau rejected a constitution of the Federated States 
of Micronesia (FSM) in large part due to fear that Palau an resources 
would be alienated and used ineffectively if Palau joined the FSM.70 
Instead, Palau began framing its own constitution toward the end 
of 1978. The legislative history of this document has become critical 
to the resolution of some of the current legal controversies. 
63 REPORT. supra note 2, at 18. 
64Id. 
65Id. at 46. The Commission noted as an advantage of independence that "it would be 
easiest to persuade the United Nations to terminate the Trusteeship Agreement ... [aJ 
strong case would have to be made for any other alternative." Id. at 45. 
66 Id. at 42. 
67 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2748-49. 
68Id. 
69 Id.; Covenant, supra note 5. 
70 Epstein, supra note 57, at 146. 
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The Palauan Constitution contains several anti-nuclear provi-
sions which have effectively prevented ratification of a Compact of 
Free Association. These provisions appear in articles II and XIII 
of the Constitution. Article XIII, section 6 states: 
Harmful substances such as nuclear ... weapons intended for 
use in warfare, nuclear power plants, and waste materials there-
from, shall not be used, tested, stored, or disposed of within the 
territorial jurisdiction of Palau without the express approval of 
not less than threelourths ... of the votes cast in a referendum 
submitted on this specific question. 71 
Article II, section 3 provides a similar requirement of a three-
fourths majority to approve any agreement between the Republic 
of Palau and another sovereign nation "which authorities [sic] use, 
testing, storage or disposal of nuclear ... weapons intended for use 
in warfare."72 These anti-nuclear constitutional provisions express 
the Palauan fear that their islands will once again become a battle-
field as well as their knowledge of the fate of neighboring Marshall 
Islanders who suffered the nuclear "experiments" of the 1960s.73 
Because the United States seeks to use Palau as a military facility, 
these constitutional provisions conflict with Compact provisions al-
lowing American vessels to transit Palau an jurisdiction. 
IV. THE CURRENT CRISIS 
A. The Plebiscites and the Compact-Constitution Conflict 
Both the terms of the U.N. Charter and the Trusteeship Agree-
ment require that the new political status of a trust territory be 
determined according to the "freely expressed" wishes of the peo-
ple. 74 To date, the people of the Republic of Palau have voted in 
six plebiscites to determine their choice of political status.75 Al-
though a Compact has never received three-fourths of the vote, the 
Government of Palau and the United States administration have 
declared a Compact to be "approved" on several occasions. The 
Palauan traditional leader Ibedul Yutaka Gibbons and others who 
71 PALAU CaNST. art. XIII, § 6 (emphasis added). 
72 Id. art. II, § 11. 
73 Epstein, supra note 57, at 146-47. 
74 Trusteeship Agreement, supra note 4, art. 6, para. 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 76. 
75 For a discussion of the use of plebiscites to exercise self-determination, see Hirayasu, 
The Process of Self-Determination and Micronesia's Future Political Status, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 487, 
501 (1987). 
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oppose the Compact have challenged these conclusions in a series 
of lawsuits.76 
In the first plebiscite on February 10, 1983, the ballot contained 
two separate questions. The first asked voters whether or not they 
approved the Compact, and the second asked them to specifically 
approve the entry of nuclear substances into Palau under the con-
stitutional provision. Sixty-two percent of the voters approved of 
the Compact while fifty-three percent voted in favor of the separate 
nuclear question.77 Based upon this return, the Palau an government 
and the United States administration declared the Compact ap-
proved.78 This conclusion was challenged in Gibbons v. Remeliik.79 In 
Remeliik, the trial division of the Palau Supreme Court held that the 
Compact had not been approved as required by the Constitution 
because of the failure to obtain three-fourths of the vote on the 
separate nuclear question.80 
A second plebiscite was held on September 4, 1984 and yielded 
sixty-seven percent in favor of the Compact.81 Following this failure, 
the Compact was amended to accommodate the language in the 
Palau an Constitution which forbids the use, testing, storage, and 
disposal of nuclear substances on Palau.82 The Senate report accom-
panying the revised Compact stated that the new version resolved 
any conflict between the Constitution and the United States' security 
responsibility.83 Following these changes, a two-thirds majority of 
each house of the Palau National Congress, the Olbiil Era Kelulau 
approved the Compact. The third national plebiscite was held on 
February 21,1986, and seventy-two percent of the population voted 
in favor of the revised Compact.84 On February 25, President Salii 
declared that the Compact had been approved and certified the 
referendum results to American Ambassador Zeder who forwarded 
them to the American Congress for consideration.85 
76 Clan leaders, such as the Ibedul, wield tremendous power on the islands even against 
elected representatives in the Congress of Palau. R. TRUMBULL, supra note 55, at 143. 
77 Gibbons v. Salii, No. 8-86, slip op. at 1, n.2 (Palau App. Div., Sept. 17, 1986). 
78 Gibbons v. Remeliik, Civ. No. 67-83 (Tr. Div. August, 1983). 
79 Gibbons v. Salii, slip op. at 1, n.2. 
8°Id. 
81Id. 
82 Compact, supra note 9. 
83 SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6230-31. 
84 Gibbons v. Salii, slip op. at 2. 
85 Id.; Note, Compacts of Free Association in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands: Plebiscite 
in the Republic of Palau, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 154, n.32 (1988). President Reagan informed 
the Congress by letter that: "On February 21, 1986, the Compact was approved by the 
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1. Gibbons v. Salii 
On May 20, 1986, Ibedul Gibbons along with a number of other 
islanders filed Gibbons v. Salii to challenge the constitutionality of 
the Compact ratification. The Gibbons complaint alleged that Com-
pact sections 312, 313, 324, and 331 concerning security and de-
fense relations conflict with article II, section 3 and article XIII, 
section 6 of the Palau an Constitution. 86 The Gibbons plaintiffs al-
leged that these Compact provisions allow the United States, or 
nations designated by the United States, to bring nuclear substances, 
including nuclear weapons and nuclear propelled ships and aircraft, 
into Palau an territory without first obtaining seventy-five percent 
of the vote as required by the Constitution.87 
The Compact provision at the heart of the controversy is section 
324 which provides: 
the Government of Palau assures the Government of the United 
States that in carrying out its security and defense responsibili-
ties under the Title, the Government of the United States has the 
right to operate nuclear capable or nuclear propelled vessels and aircraft 
within the jurisdiction of Palau without either confirming or denying 
the presence or absence of such weapons within the jurisdiction of 
Palau. 88 
The Gibbons court considered whether the words "use" and "store" 
of article II and article XIII of the Palauan Constitution prohibit 
the activity the Compact describes.89 After determining that the 
Constitution was ambiguous on these questions, the court looked to 
the legislative history of the Constitution. The court's lengthy ex-
amination of this history provides a clear view of the tension be-
tween Palau an legislators and the American representatives. 
The Standing Committee Report of the Palau Constitutional 
Convention sets forth the purpose of the anti-nuclear provisions of 
the Constitution: 
The Committee felt that the environment of [Palau] . is a 
public trust of which all citizens, living and yet unborn, are 
beneficiaries. As a trustee, [Palau] is obligated to act in a manner 
best calculated to assure the protection of the air, water, and 
Palau an people .... I urge the Congress to approve the Compact of Free Association for 
Palau." SENATE REPORT, supra note 12, at 6237-38. 
86 Gibbons v. Salii, slip op. at 2-3. 
87Id. 
88 Compact, supra note 9, § 324 (emphasis added). 
"" Gibbons v. Salii, slip op. at 7-9. 
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other natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion .... 
The Committee ... felt that harmful substances should be 
specifically prohibited, unless the people decide otherwise in a 
referendum .... The intent of this Proposal [No. 91] is to 
prevent the introduction of harmful substances, including but 
not limited to radioactive materials ... into [Palau] unless ap-
proved by three-quarters of the registered voters in a referen-
dum submitted on the specific question.gO 
During the Constitutional Convention, American Ambassador 
Peter Rosenblatt sent a cable to the Convention regarding the pro-
posal: "As drafted proposal 91 might effectively prevent u.s. war-
ships and aircraft from transiting Palau either in time of peace or 
war. We urge that this proposal be dropped .... Unless deleted or 
amended, the proposed language would create problems of the 
utmost gravity for the U.S."9J The Convention refused to amend 
the proposal and it was adopted into the Palau Constitution as article 
XIII, section six. 92 The Convention also inserted almost identical 
language into Proposal 364 relating to international agreements. 
Proposal 364 was adopted as article II, section three of the Consti-
tution.93 
The first constitutional plebiscite took place July 9, 1979. 
Ninety-two percent of voters approved the draft Constitution.94 
However, concern that negative American reaction to the Consti-
tution would upset the Compact negotiations led to the repeal of 
the Palauan Constitutional Convention's enabling legislation.95 The 
repeal effectively nullified the returns of the first constitutional 
plebiscite.96 The Palau Constitutional Drafting Commission then 
undertook to "reconcile, void and eliminate any conflicting incon-
sistencies or incompatibilities" between the Constitution and the 
proposed free association agreement. 97 The Drafting Commission 
proposed changes to article XIII, section 6 that allowed American 
nuclear vessels and aircraft to transit Palau an waters without re-
quiring the three-fourths voter approval. Changes to article II, 
section 3 also included the removal of the three-fourths majority 
90Id. at 10. 
91Id. at 12. 
92Id. 
93Id. at 13. 
94 Id. 
95Id. 
96Id. 
97Id. at 13-14. 
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requirement as well as a reduction in the majority of votes needed 
in each house of the legislature. 
A referendum on the new version of the Constitution took 
place on October 23, 1979 and obtained only thirty-one percent of 
the vote.98 A telex to Ambassador Rosenblatt from Mr. Roman 
Tmetuchl, Chairman of the Palau Political Status Commission 
stated: 
The revised Constitution of Palau, which was defeated at ref-
erendum on October 23, accommodated free association. The 
revisions were proposed to give the people of Palau an oppor-
tunity to choose between a Constitution compatible with the 
draft compact of free association and a Constitution declared 
incompatible with the compact by the United States government 
in its policy statement of April 30, 1979. By rejecting the revised 
Constitution, the people have spoken clearly in expressing their 
support of a Constitution which prohibits transit of American 
warships through Palauan waters and use of Palauan land by 
American military units. 99 
Following the defeat of the revised version of the Constitution, the 
Palauan legislature reinstated the language of the first draft. This 
document was approved by seventy-eight percent of the voters in a 
plebiscite on July 9, 1980.100 
After examining this telling legislative history, the Gibbons court 
concluded that the public debate on the Constitution was "based 
upon the assumption that both article XIII, section 6 and article II, 
section 3 circumscribed the right of the Republic of Palau to autho-
rize United States warships to transit Palau[n] waters."101 The court 
held that the nuclear control provisions of article XIII and article 
II apply to any international agreement which is entered into by 
Palau 102 and that the words "use" and "store" cannot be construed 
so narrowly as to allow nuclear vessels to transit Palauan waters. 103 
98 [d. at 15-16. 
99 [d. at 16. 
100 [d. 
101 [d. at 20. 
102 [d. at 21. 
103 [d. at 22. As a subsidiary issue, the Gibbons decision considered the constitutionality 
of the Compact provisions which give the United States the right to take Palau an land. Article 
XIII, section 7 of the Palauan Constitution prohibits the taking of property by eminent 
domain for "the benefit of a foreign entity." Section 322 of the Compact gives the United 
States the right to "establish and use defense sites in Palau ... [and) designate for this 
purpose land and water areas and improvements which shall come into force simultaneous 
with this Compact." The Palauan government must deliver the land within sixty days of the 
request. The Gibbons court did not hold that section 322(b) of the Compact was unconstitu-
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2. The Political and Economic Crisis 
After the Gibbons decision and prior to the fourth plebiscite, 
the Palauan government stepped up the campaign of political ed-
ucation about the Compact. The means and tactics used in this 
"education" campaign have been arguably one-sided. As will be 
shown below, the Palauan government's interest in approving the 
Compact is primarily economic. 
Several government actions were noted by the United Nations 
visiting mission as evidence of possible coercion. 104 On November 
17, 1986, two weeks before the fourth plebiscite, the Palauan Min-
ister of Social Services issued a memorandum to the directors of all 
government bureaux. The document stated that all government 
personnel were expected to campaign vigorously for the Compact 
and that those choosing "to campaign otherwise shall be reported 
to me [Nobuo Swei, Minister] at once .... It is no longer tolerable 
for civil service employees to oppose the system while remaining in 
it and enjoying all the benefits due dedicated employees."105 This 
memorandum was later tempered by a letter from the Minister of 
State to all government employees informing them that they were 
free to vote as they wished without fear of retaliation. 106 The vote 
of the fourth plebiscite showed sixty-five percent of voters in favor 
of the Compact. On June 30, 1987, a fifth plebiscite was held which 
showed sixty-seven percent of the vote in favor of the Compact. 
At this time, economic difficulties became paramount. 107 Im-
mediately following the June 30 plebiscite, President Salii an-
tional on its face. The court did note, however, that there is a constitutional threat inherent 
in the provision. Id. at 31-36. 
104 Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Observe the Plebiscite in Palau, Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands, August 1987, U.N. TCOR Supp. (No.3), U.N. Doc. TIl920 at 3 (1987) 
[hereinafter August U.N. Mission Report]. 
105 [d. at 31. 
1061d. at 33. 
107 The severe economic problems confronting Palau appear to be caused by the Palauan 
government's mismanagement of funds and also by political corruption. In 1981, President 
Salii began negotiations with a British corporation, International Power Systems Co. Ltd. 
(IPSECO) to build a large power plant in Palau. The plant was eventually built and financed 
by a consortium of international banks. There is strong evidence that Salii and several other 
top Palauan officials accepted bribes totalling $975,000 from the contractor who eventually 
built the plant. To date, the power plant sits idle, IPSECO is bankrupt, and the banks have 
won a judgment against Palau in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York to pay the thirty-two million dollar debt. CONGo Q., (March 18, 1989) at 875-76; See 
Morgan Guaranty Trust V. Republic of Palau, 680 F.Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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nounced the furlough of two-thirds of all government employees. !Os 
This action had an immediate effect upon the population because 
a large proportion of all workers are employed by the state. 109 
President Salii cited extreme financial difficulties as the reason for 
the furlough. IIO The nearly 1,000 furloughed workers began what 
can be characterized as a reign of terror against the constitutional 
activists. The unemployed workers perceived the activist minority 
as the cause of all financial difficulty on Palau since they had effec-
tively blocked the Compact approval. 111 Demonstrations, death 
threats, and fire bombings were directed against the proponents of 
the Constitution. 112 
3. The Constitutional Amendment 
Facing crisis, the Palauan government sought a new means of 
ratifying the Compact without the necessary three-quarters vote. A 
constitutional amendment was proposed. On July 19, 1987, the 
Olbiil Era Kelulau passed RPPL 2-30 which provided that "for pur-
poses of avoiding inconsistencies between the Compact ... and the 
Constitution ... [the nuclear control provisions of the Constitution] 
shall not apply to the Compact .... "113 On August 4, 1987, the 
proposed constitutional amendment was approved by seventy per-
cent of the voters in a national referendum. 114 
The sixth Compact referendum was held on August 21 and 
secured seventy-three percent of the vote, which pursuant to the 
"amended" Constitution, was sufficient to approve the Compact. IIS 
This conclusion was immediately challenged in the suit Merep v. 
Salii. 116 The M erep plaintiffs alleged that the amendment process 
10H August U.N. Mission Report, supra note 104, at 3. 
lOY As of 1977, the government economy employed 75% of all wage-earners. Epstein, 
supra note 57, at 144. 
110 August U.N. Mission Report, supra note 104, at 3. 
III Id. 
112 Briefing Paper, supra note 24, at 4. 
113 The proposed amendment goes on to provide that if the amendment is approved by 
a majority vote in an August 4 referendum, a referendum on the Compact will be held on 
August 21, 19S7. Fritz v. Salii, No. 161-S7 slip op. at 3 (Sup. Ct. of Palau, Trial Div., Mar. 
22, 1985). 
114 Fritz v. Salii, slip op. at 5. 
liS Id. 
116 Merep v. Salii, No. 139-S7 (Sup. Ct. of Palau, Trial Div., Aug. IS, 19S7). 
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did not follow the correct constitutional procedure and was there-
fore void. 117 
Violence in Palau continued to escalate. On August 25, Mamora 
Nakamura, Chief Justice of the Palau Supreme Court, recused him-
self from the Merep case because of death threats against himself 
and his family.llS On August 29, in response to the growing vio-
lence, Ibedul Gibbons announced the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding with President Salii which included the stipulation 
that the Merep suit be dropped. 119 
On August 31, busloads of Palau an women arrived at the court-
house to refile the suit, now named N girmang v. Salii.120 Leading 
plaintiffs, Gloria Gibbons and Gabriela Ngirmang, asserted that 
they would stand up for their rights even if others could not. 121 On 
September 7, the night before a hearing on the government's mo-
tion to dismiss, Bedor Bins, father of one of the plaintiffs and of 
lawyer Roman Bedor, was assassinated. 122 
On September 9, the plaintiffs withdrew their case. The trial 
court Judge Robert Hefner noted at the time of the withdrawal: 
"There are indications in the record and in the proceedings in this 
matter that the Dismissal signed by the Plaintiffs may not be vol-
untary. There are indications that the Dismissal was brought about 
by intimidation through the use of violence."123 
On March 31, 1988, after securing counsel from the Center 
for Constitutional Rights in New York, the Palauan women filed a 
Motion to Set Aside the Dismissal. In granting the motion, the judge 
noted that the "previous dismissal was neither voluntary nor of their 
own free will, but, to the contrary was procured by violence, intim-
idation and threats ... so intense and pervasive as to vitiate the 
consent." 124 
117 [d. 
118 A replacement, Robert Hefner, Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Court of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, heard the case. Stark, Palau - A challenge to the Rule of Law in 
Micronesia, 62 AUST. L.J. 564 (1987). 
119 Fritz v. Sal ii, slip op. at II. 
120 It is not coincidental that the suit was pressed by women. The matrilineal birth line 
in Palau affords elder women of noble lineage great respect and deference. The authority 
and strength of Palauan women has become important in the current crisis in Palau. H. 
BARNETT, supra note 3, at 18-20. 
121 Ngirmang's house was fire-bombed shortly after the suit was filed. Ngirmang v. Salii, 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside Stipulated Dismissal, 
Civil Action 161-87, at 2-3 (on file at Boston College Third World Law Journal Office). 
122 [d. 
123 [d. 
124 Plaintiff Rafaela Sumang describes the events leading up to the withdrawal of the 
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4. Fritz v. Salii 
The suit, now captioned Fritz v. Salii, was heard by the trial 
division of the Palau Supreme Court to determine the constitution-
ality of the amendment procedure. 125 In addressing the plaintiffs' 
arguments, the decision by Judge Hefner details the two amend-
ment procedures in the Palau an Constitution. Under article XIV, 
entitled Amendments, a proposed amendment must be adopted by 
not less than three-quarters of each house of the Olbiil Era Kelulau 
and must be approved by a majority of the voters in not less than 
three-fourths of the states in the next general election. 126 The gov-
ernment defendants in Fritz conceded that this lengthy procedure 
was not followed. 127 
Instead, the government defendants relied upon article XV, 
section 11. This provision, entitled "Transition," specifically ad-
dresses amendments made necessary to avoid inconsistency with the 
Compact. 128 Article XV does not specify the procedure for the 
proposal of an amendment or the timing of a referendum as does 
article XIV.129 It provides only that an amendment be approved by 
a majority of the votes in three-fourths of the states. 130 The govern-
ment argued that since the amendment was to avoid inconsistency 
with the Compact, the lesser standards of article XV were justly 
utilized. 131 
Judge Hefner found that the use of article XV procedures was 
improper because no "inconsistency" between the Compact and the 
Constitution existed. 132 The nuclear control provisions provide a 
means by which nuclear materials can enter Palau - a three-quar-
ters majority vote; therefore, both the Compact and the Constitu-
suit: "I saw organized groups of furloughed government workers marching on foot or driving 
in cars and trucks to the court. One of the vehicles was a van wrapped in black cloth that 
was parked at the court. Written on the front of the van was '73% Majority Give Us Justice' 
on the passenger side, it said 'Black September Rest in Peace.''' Ngirmang v. Salii, Affidavit 
of Rafaela Sumang, (on file at Boston College Third World Law Journal Office). 
125 Fritz v. Salii, No. 161-87 slip op. at 3 (Sup. Ct. of Palau, Trial Div., Mar. 22, 19S5). 
126 Article XIV provides that amendments can be proposed by a Constitutional Conven-
tion, popular initiative (petition signed by 25% of voters) or by a resolution adopted by not 
less than three-fourths of the members of each house of the Olbiil Era Kelulau Article XIV 
(b)(c). PALAU CONST., art. XIV; art. XV. 
127 Fritz v. Salii, slip op. at IS. 
12S Id. 
129Id. at 17-IS. 
130Id. 
131Id. 
132 [d. at 2S. 
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tion can stand at the same time and are not per se inconsistent. 133 
The trial court also ruled that the article XV provisions were sub-
sidiary to the more specific article XIV provisions and therefore 
subject to them. 134 This finding was based upon the language of 
article XIV that prescribes the more specific procedure for an 
amendment to the Constitution without excepting the article XV 
amendments. 135 The judge stated that the framers of the Palau an 
Constitution inserted the high standards and requirements into 
article XIV "[i]n order to provide stability to the Constitution and 
to ascertain that there is sufficient support for any amendment 
proposed .... "136 Article XIV provides no exception to these 
exacting procedures. 137 Judge Hefner's decision not only nullified 
the results of the referendum but his finding of consistency between 
the Compact and the Constitution ruled out the possible future use 
of article XV to amend the Constitution. 138 
The lower court decision was appealed. The appellate division 
of the Palauan Supreme Court confirmed the lower court's ruling 
that article XV is subject to the more specific provisions of article 
XIV and cannot be read by itself. 139 The appellate justices, however, 
did not agree with the finding that the Compact and Constitution 
were "consistent."14o Instead, they concluded that because the Con-
stitution prohibits nuclear substances absent a seventy-five percent 
majority, a percentage they characterized as "well nigh impossible," 
it cannot stand alongside the Compact. 141 The appellate court's 
ruling allows the use of article XV for the purpose of amending 
the nuclear provisions of the Constitution. The appellate court 
decision leaves open the door to amend the Constitution, using 
article XV procedures at any time. 142 The nuclear control provisions 
of the Palau an Constitution may soon be amended so that the 
current Compact which allows nuclear substances into Palau can be 
approved by a simple majority of voters. 143 
I:B Jd. at 28-29. 
134 Jd. at 23. 
1:\., fd. at 24. 
136 Jd. 
137 fd. 
m fd. at 29-30; Fritz v. Salii, No. 161-87 slip op. at 13 (Sup. Ct. of Palau, Appellate 
Diy., Aug. 8, 1988) [hereinafter Fritz II]. 
139 Fritz II at 25-26. 
14llJd. at 13. 
14J fd. at 3. 
I" fd. at 17. 
143 The OEK has recently passed enabling legislation for a seventh plebiscite to occur in 
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B. U.S. Congressional Action 
The terms of the Compact require American congressional 
approval in the form of a joint resolution. 144 On March 8, 1989, 
Congressman Ron de Lugo, along with sixty-three Republican and 
Democratic co-sponsors, introduced House Joint Resolution 175. 145 
This bill amends the Compact by providing additional funding for 
law enforcement, medical facilities, and a special prosecutor and 
auditor for Palau. 146 The bill also provides funds to settle Palau's 
large debt for a failed power plant project. 147 Congress views the 
measure as a favorable compromise between Palau and the United 
States, and, despite concern about the past violence in Palau, has 
passed the legislation. 148 
V. THE FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DETERMINING THE 
POLITICAL STATUS OF PALAU 
A. The Role of the Security Council 
Now that Congress has approved the Compact and once it is 
ratified by a constitutional majority of the Palauan people, the issue 
of formal termination of the Trusteeship Agreement under the 
U.N. Charter must be addressed. 149 Because the TTPI is the sole 
strategic trusteeship, the process of U.N. termination is without 
precedent. The usual process for termination of a trusteeship agree-
ment is that a recommendation from the Trusteeship Council is 
forwarded to the General Assembly for a formal resolution. 150 
Because the TTPI is a strategic trusteeship, however, the role 
of the General Assembly has been replaced by the Security Council. 
The controlling provision of the U.N. Charter is article 83 which 
early 1990. BELAU UPDATE NEWSL. Nov. 27, 1989 (on file at Boston College Third World 
Law Journal Office). 
144 Compact, supra note 9, § 101 (d)(l)(B); § 411. 
145 H.J. Res. 175, 101st Congo 1st Sess., 135 CONGo REc. E689 (daily ed. Mar. 8,1989). 
146 !d. 
147 See supra note 107. 
148 See CONGo Q. (daily ed. June 10, 1989) at 1421; CONGo Q. (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1989) at 
297; BELAU UPDATE NEWSL., supra note 143. 
149 The lack of congressional concern over the necessary approval of the U.N. in ter-
minating the trusteeship is demonstrated by the lack of mention of the role of the U.N. in 
the congressional debates and such statements in the Congressional Quarterly as: "Once 
Palau ratifies the compact it will cease to be a U.N. trusteeship under the paternal adminis-
tration of the United States." CONGo Q. (daily ed. Aug. 19, 1989) at 2184-85. 
150 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 929. 
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states: "All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic 
areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agree-
ments and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the 
Security Council."151 
At the time the Trusteeship Agreement was drafted, the Amer-
ican negotiators made clear that approval by the Security Council 
was necessary before termination of the trusteeship.152 Ambassador 
Warren Austin, United States representative to the Security Council, 
stated that the Trusteeship Agreement "is in the nature of a bilateral 
agreement between the United States ... and the Security Council 
... [and] no amendment or termination can take place without the 
approval of the Security Council."153 
This position has been continuously affirmed. In February 
1986, the British representative to the U.N. Visiting Mission to 
Observe the Plebiscite in Palau stated in response to allegations that 
the United States might circumvent the Security Council: "It is 
simply not true that there is any attempt to bypass the Security 
Council. The United Nations mission has made it clear both to 
political leaders and at public meetings that the termination of the 
trusteeship will have to be decided by the Security Council."154 
The Security Council has delegated to the Trusteeship Council 
the authority to inquire into the conditions of the TTPI and the 
Trusteeship Council submits an annual report to the Security Coun-
cil. 155 The Trusteeship Council has sent teams of observers and 
submitted reports on the TTPI since the Trusteeship began. In 
May 1986, the Trusteeship Council passed resolution 2183 (LIII) 
which states: 
[The Trusteeship Council,] 
Conscious of the responsibility of the Security Council in respect 
of the strategic areas as set out in [a]rticle 83, para. 1 of the 
Charter, 
1. Notes that the peoples of the Northern Mariana Islands, the 
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau 
have freely exercised their right to self-determination in plebi-
scites observed by the visiting missions of the Trusteeship Coun-
151 U.N. CHARTER art. 83, para. 1 (emphasis added). This language is identical to that of 
article 85 relating to trusteeship agreements for non-strategic trust territories except that the 
role of the Security Council is replaced by the General Assembly. U.N. CHARTER art. 85, 
para.!. 
152 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 931-32. 
153Id.; 2 U.N. SCOR (23rd mtg.) at 475-76 (1947) (emphasis added). 
154 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 931. 
155 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2929. 
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cil and have chosen free association with the United States of 
America .... 156 
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The Trusteeship Council goes on to say that it "[c]onsiders that the 
Government of the United States has satisfactorily discharged its 
obligations under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and that 
it is appropriate for that Agreement to be terminated .... "157 The 
final portion of the resolution requests that the Secretary General 
circulate the resolution to the Security Council for consideration. 158 
Although this Trusteeship Council resolution is without force 
and clearly contemplates the role of the Security Council in termi-
nating the trusteeship, recent events suggest that the United States 
may seek to bypass the Security Council. 159 The most likely reason 
for a decision to avoid the Security Council would be fear of a Soviet 
veto. The likelihood of a veto is great, not only because of the Soviet 
propensity for exercising the veto but also because the USSR has 
consistently voiced opposition to the United States' policy towards 
the TTPI.160 
Recent actions vis a vis the other three TTPI districts provide 
the best evidence of the United States' intent to unilaterally termi-
nate the Trusteeship Agreement. Because the other three districts 
have already approved separate agreements with the United States, 
they are one step beyond Palau in the process of termination. On 
October 24, 1986, the U.N. Secretary General circulated a letter 
from the United States Permanent Representative. 161 The letter 
referred to Trusteeship Council Resolution 2183 (LIII) and in-
formed the Secretary General that: 
... as a consequence of consultations held between the United 
States Government and the Government of the Marshall Is-
lands, agreement was reached that 21 October [1986] is the date 
upon which the Compact of Free Association with the Marshall 
156T.C. Res. 2183(Llll), 53 U.N. TCORSupp. (No.3) at 14, U.N. DOC. TI1901 (1986). 
157 !d. 
158 !d.; This resolution is without force and is believed by some to be evidence that the 
Trusteeship Council members are unwilling or unable to hold the U.S. accountable to the 
Trusteeship Agreement. UNITED METHODIST OFFICE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS NEWSL., 
Spring 1988, at 2-3 (on file at Boston College Third World Law Journal Office); The current 
members of the Trusteeship Council are China, France, USSR, UK, and USA. The voting 
procedure in the Council is one member, one vote. All decisions are made by a majority vote. 
!d.; U.N. CHARTER art. 86. 
159 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 929. For a description of the functions of Trusteeship 
Council see chapters XII and XIII of the U.N. Charter. 
160 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2930. 
161 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 929; U.N. Doc. SI18424 (1986). 
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Islands enters into force. Furthermore, I am pleased to inform 
you that the Compact of Free Association with the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Commonwealth Covenant with the 
Northern Mariana Islands will enter into force on 3 November 
1986.1(i2 
The letter further stated that the Secretary General would be in-
formed "of arrangements for entry into force of the Compact of 
Free Association with Palau once accord had been reached on the 
effective date of that agreement."163 The letter refers only to the 
"entry into force" of the Compact and not the termination of the 
Trusteeship Agreement. 164 
On November 3, 1986, however, President Reagan issued Pro-
clamation 5564 "Placing into Full Force and Effect the Covenant 
with the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the 
Compacts of Free Association with the Federated States of Micro-
nesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands."165 This document 
states that the United States has fulfilled its obligations under the 
Trusteeship Agreement with respect to these three TTPI dis-
tricts. 166 Although released in November 1986, this document was 
not sent to the United Nations until April 14, 1987. 167 When the 
document was delivered to the United Nations on it was noted that 
"in compliance with Presidential proclamation [5564] ... this is the 
final report of the United States of America to the Trusteeship 
Council ... " with respect to the three TTPI districts. 168 
If the United States should act unilaterally, as these actions 
suggest, it will likely draw the criticism of the international com-
munity. Most commentators agree that the consent of the United 
Nations is necessary for termination of the trusteeship.169 The Aus-
tralian commentator Geoffrey Marston, writing in 1969, on termi-
nation of trusteeship stated: 
... all the trusteeship agreements were instruments concluded 
between the Administering Authority on the one hand and the 
United Nations Organization through its appropriate organ on 
162 Clarke Letter. supra note 13. at 929. 
163 [d. 
164 [d. 
165 [d. at 930. See Presidential Proclamation No. 5564, Nov. 3, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,399 
( 1986). 
1G6 Clarke Letter, supra note 13, at 930. 
167 Id.; U.N. Doc. TIl909 (1987). 
16R Id. 
169 Marston, supra note 14, at 31; Clarke letter, supra note 13; de Lugo Statement, supra 
note 8, at H3223. 
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the other. They have, therefore, a consensual basis .... They 
are drafted in the format of international treaties, they have 
been recorded in the United Nations Treaty Series and it has 
never been maintained by the States that they are other than 
what they purport to be, namely, instruments governed by the 
rules of international law. 170 
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Marston details the form of consent necessary for the termi-
nation of the trusteeship agreements. He maintains that the form 
of consent is governed by the specific provisions of the U.N. Charter 
under which the agreements were made. Thus, a General Assembly 
resolution agreeing to termination would have to be by a two-thirds 
majority of the Members present and voting according to article 19 
of the Charter. This has been the practice with the termination of 
all of the trusteeship agreements. l7l Likewise, termination of the 
strategic trusteeship calls for an affirmative vote of nine Members 
of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the per-
manent members, as prescribed by Article 27 (3) of the Charter. 172 
B. International Court of justice Precedent 
Trusteeship Agreements and their predecessors, the League of 
Nations Mandates, have consistently been interpreted by the Inter-
national Court of Justice (IC]) as treaties, and as such require a 
consensual basis for termination. 173 An analogy to the action of the 
Union of South Africa towards South West Africa (Namibia) has 
been frequently drawn to determine the legality of unilateral ter-
mination. Prior to World War II, South West Africa was a mandate 
held by the Union of South Africa under the League of Natiom. 
At the close of the war, the Union of South Africa refused to place 
the territory under the newly created International Trusteeship 
System. Instead, South Africa attempted to incorporate the territory 
as an integral part of the Union of South Africa. 174 The IC], in the 
International Status of South West Africa 175 case, unanimously held that 
"the Union of South Africa acting alone does not possess the com-
17() Marston, supra note 14, at II. 
171 Macdonald, supra note 52, at 255; Opinion of the Legal Council of the United Nations 
to the Trusteeship Council, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.4) 23, U.N. Doc. A/9604 (1974), 
reprinted in [1974] U.N. JUR. Y.B. 181. 
172 Marston, supra note 14, at 13. 
173 [d. at II; The International Status of South-West Africa Cases, [1950] I.C.]. Reports 
128, 158. 
174 [1950] I.C.J. Reports 128,134-36. 
175 [1950] I.C.]. Reports 128. 
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petence to modify the international status of the territory of South 
West Africa."176 In a separate opinion, Judge McNair stated in this 
case that "there can be no doubt that the Mandate, which embodies 
international obligations, belongs to the category of treaty or con-
vention."I77 
Members of the ICJ have specifically addressed the question of 
whether trusteeship agreements are treaties. In the Case Concerning 
the Northern Cameroons, the ICJ proceeded on the basis that the 
trusteeship agreements were subject to the law of treaties. 17s Judge 
Fitzmaurice stated in a separate opinion: 
... the Trust Agreement was concluded by ... a resolution of 
the United Nations Assembly, and it has been common ground 
throughout the present case that the sale entities formerly par-
ties to it were the Administering Authority [U.K.] on the one 
hand, and the United Nations represented by the General As-
sembly on the other .... 179 
With this precedent in the ICJ and the risk of unfavorable inter-
national criticism, the United States must closely consider the wis-
dom of sidestepping the process for formal termination. 
C. An Analysis of the Trusteeship Using the Criteria Established by the 
United Nations Charter and General Assembly Resolution 1541 
If the issue of termination comes before the Security Council, 
and assuming arguendo that the Soviet Union does not immediately 
veto the proposition, the merits of the Compact will be closely 
reviewed. The basic objectives of the International Trusteeship Sys-
tem embodied in article 76 of the Charter will likely guide the 
Security Council's consideration. Thus, the question of whether the 
United States has helped to "promote the political, economic, social, 
and educational advancement of the trust territories towards self-
government or independence ... " will be paramount. ISO The success 
of the United States towards achieving these goals is mixed. 
The Charter charges the administering authority with political 
development. The judicial and political battles waged in Palau's 
courts and legislature are ironically the best evidence that this 
176 [d. at 144; Macdonald, supra note 52, at 259-60. 
l77 [1950]l.C.]. Reports 128, 158. 
178 Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) Prelim-
inary Objections [1963] I.C.]. Reports 15; Marston, supra note 14, at 11. 
179 [1963]l.C.J. Reports 15, 113; Macdonald, supra note 52, at 257. 
180 U.N. CHARTER art. 76. 
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Charter goal has been met. The formation of the Congress of 
Micronesia and the funding and encouragement of Micronesian 
representatives to consider political status demonstrates an Ameri-
can commitment to the principal of self-determination. The reality 
of the United States' actions, however, belies this encouragement. 
The failure to respect the decisions of Palauan legislators and judges 
who have sought to protect Palau's Constitution demonstrates the 
value which the United States has placed upon the Palauan democ-
racy which it originally fostered. 
The Charter also charges the administering authority with eco-
nomic development. As noted above, the economic pressure in 
Palau is immense. Critics have made the allegation that the United 
States has purposefully kept the islands at a level of subsistence so 
as to rob them of the power of true self-determination. This asser-
tion is also common among the islanders themselves. As Represen-
tative Santos Olikong, speaker of the Palau National Congress, re-
cently stated to the Trusteeship Council: 
The [United States] has used its position as Palau's major source 
of funding to put great pressure on Palau to enter into free 
association. The Compact is held up to our people as the only 
solution to our financial problems. 
[T]he [United States] is eager for Palau to enter into free 
association so that [its] past failure to meet its obligations under 
the Trusteeship Agreement will become moot and no longer 
subject to scrutiny.181 
The failure of the United States to lift the Palauan economy above 
the subsistence level is particularly serious as the islands were self-
sufficient under their Japanese administrators. 182 
In addition to Charter provisions, the Security Council may 
also look to Resolution 1541 (XV), as it contains specific guidance 
on free association. The core principles of Resolution 1541 require 
that a freely associated state 1) maintain the right to determine its 
internal constitution; 2) be allowed to choose its political status freely 
without compulsion; and 3) retain the right to become independent 
at a later time. 183 
Palau has clearly exercised its right to determine an internal 
constitution. Despite efforts to circumvent the protections of the 
181 U.N. Doc.T/PV. 1650 (May 12, 1988). 
182 This economic development, however, did not always benefit the Micronesians who 
worked long days for the benefit of foreign interests. Hirayasu, supra note 75, at 490. 
183 See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution, Palau's judiciary has carefully protected this docu-
ment. 184 The decision of the appellate division of the Palau Supreme 
Court in Fritz v. Salii is a possible inroad into the protections of the 
Constitution. It is unlikely, however, that the Security Council would 
find fault with the basic protections within the Constitution or the 
integrity of the document. 
Resolution 1541 also states that free association "should be the 
result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory 
concerned through informed and democratic processes."185 The 
allegations of coercion and the threats towards opponents of the 
Compact raise serious questions about the voluntary choice afforded 
the Palauan population. However, the Trusteeship Council has 
sanctioned each plebiscite despite evidence of government pres-
sure. 186 
Resolution 1541 also dictates that a freely associated state must 
maintain the right to choose independence should it so desire. While 
provisions exist for the unilateral termination of the Compact by 
Palau, there are important exceptions to this provision. 187 Section 
311 pertaining to Security and Defense Relations cannot be termi-
nated unilaterally by Palau. 188 This section of the Compact gives the 
United States the right to deny the territorial jurisdiction of Palau 
to all other military forces in perpetuity.189 As these defense pro-
visions are the core of the Compact, it seems clear that Palau has 
not been granted the "freedom to modify the status" of free asso-
ciation. 
While this discussion has primarily addressed the Palau an sit-
uation, the United States will probably not attempt to terminate the 
TTPI piecemeal. 190 A discussion of the merits of each TTPI district 
agreement is beyond the scope of this paper. There is serious doubt, 
however, as to whether the aquisition of the Northern Mariana 
Islands as sovereign United States territory under the common-
wealth agreement will be acceptable. 191 
IR4 See infra notes 69 to 142 and accompanying text. 
185 G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 49. 
186 August U.N. Mission Report, supra note 104, at 3. 
187 Compact, supra note 9, art. IV; art. V. 
18R Id. 
189 de Lugo Statement, supra note 8, at H3203. 
190 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2930. 
191 Id. Some commentators, however, do not see that the commonwealth status of the 
Northern Mariana Islands should impede U.N. approval. See Hirayasu, supra note 75, at 
515-17. 
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If, however, the Security Council were to judge the Pacific 
Trusteeship by the criteria of the United Nations Charter and Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 1541, it appears unlikely that the Security 
Council would sanction termination of the trusteeship under the 
terms of the current Compact for Palau. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The struggle for self-determination in Palau is evidence that 
Palauans have taken to heart the lessons of democracy and consti-
tutional government taught by the United States. The American 
model has been held up to this island territory as a worthy example. 
The manner in which our government chooses to terminate this 
trusteeship will convince the beneficiaries of this island trust of the 
ultimate value of the model of government which we have taught 
to them. The importance of the International Trusteeship System 
lies in the degree of protection which will be afforded Palauans 
should the United States attempt to circumvent the international 
regime which it helped to create. 
Ruth C. Slocum 
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